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The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do
You Trust?

ABSTRACT
Tax compliance is an important issue for governments and the public alike. To meet
public needs and fund public mandates, firms around the world are expected to comply with tax
laws. Factors that are related to organizational (firm) tax compliance have not been sufficiently
examined in the literature. Due to the increasing global influence of transition economies, factors
associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particularly of interest. Based on
a sample of over 5,000 firms from 22 former Soviet Bloc transition economies, we find that
higher levels of corruption and higher levels of particularized trust (reliance on friends and
family) are associated with lower levels of tax compliance. Interestingly, we also find that the
negative relationship between corruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher
generalized trust (trust in strangers). Overall, our study’s results suggest that institutional factors
play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies.

Cite as: Alon A. and Hageman A. 2013. Impact of Corruption on Organizational Tax
Compliance in Transition Economies. Journal of Business Ethics. Forthcoming.
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The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do
You Trust?
INTRODUCTION
Tax compliance is an important issue for nations around the world as governments search
for revenue to meet public needs (Andreoni et al., 1998). Firms around the world are expected to
behave ethically and comply with tax laws. However, the ethics of tax compliance is a complex
issue as noted in the essay by Kavka (1983). In his example, firms are expected to act ethically
but may be justified in underreporting revenue if the taxation system is corrupt. “Under these
circumstances, any company that reported its true profits would not be believed and would end
up having to pay more than its fair share of taxes” (Kavka, 1983, p. 63). Robertson et al. (2002)
noted that ethical responses depend on the situational context. Countries with different
institutional influences may have alternative views of what is ethical as it relates to tax
compliance.
With transition economies1 playing an increasingly important role in the global economy
and politics, organizational (firm) tax compliance is particularly of interest. Currently, there is a
lack of theoretical explanation and empirical evidence about tax behavior in transition economies
(Torgler, 2005). This lack of research is of particular concern given an increasingly important
role of transition economies.
The majority of prior tax compliance studies have examined individual behavior
(Andreoni et al. 1998). Tax compliance by firms is an important but understudied issue (Torgler,
2008; Bayer and Cowell, 2009). Specifically, firm behavior is not analogous to individual
behavior due to both the internal structure of corporations (in which multiple parties are involved

1

Transition economies are developing countries that are transitioning from centrally-planned to market-based
economies, such as former Soviet Bloc countries (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, etc.).
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in decision making) and the potential influence of other firms (particularly in industries
dominated by a small number of firms; Bayer and Cowell, 2009). Anderoni et al. (1998, p. 856)
wrote, “there is a need for more empirical and institutional research within jurisdictions outside
of the U.S. Available evidence suggests that noncompliance is particularly acute in many
developing countries, making them especially fertile areas for future research efforts.” Thus, the
purpose of this study is to evaluate the relationship between institutional factors and
organizational tax compliance in transition economies.
Transition economies are frequently associated with high levels of corruption
(Kaufmann, 2009). Corruption is defined as the abuse of power for private gain (e.g., Aguilera
and Vadera, 2008). Numerous studies have documented the negative impact of corruption on
economic development (e.g., Campos et al., 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny,
1993; Mauro, 1995). Corruption is also deemed negatively associated with tax compliance
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). However, according to Ashforth et al. (2008), there is a need to
provide a deeper understanding of the construct of corruption. This study draws upon economic
and institutional perspectives to investigate the relationship between corruption and tax
compliance in transition economies.
The endemic corruption that is frequently observed in transition economies is

conceptualized as an institutional factor (Teorell, 2007) that is expected to negatively impact
firm tax compliance. The impact of corruption on economic variables differs among countries.
Despite high levels of corruption, some nations still demonstrate high growth and attract
significant foreign investment (Li, 2009). Closer examination revealed that the levels and type of
social trust play a role in the degree of influence of corruption. High levels of trust among
societal members reduce the negative impact of corruption on economic growth (Li and Wu,
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2007; Li, 2009). However, prior studies that have examined the role of trust in transition
economies have failed to differentiate between generalized trust (trust in strangers) and
particularized trust (reliance on friends and family). We draw on work by Li (2009) for the
distinction between particularized trust and generalized trust and examine how these factors are
related to firm tax compliance. We also examine the potential interactive role of corruption and
trust.
We test our proposed model based on a comprehensive dataset containing responses from
executives at over 5,000 firms in 22 transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc. The findings
indicate that higher levels of corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) and higher levels of
particularized trust are each associated with lower levels of tax compliance. We also find that the
negative relationship between tax compliance and corruption is weakened in situations of higher
generalized trust. These findings suggest that the established trust patterns of firm managers
within organizations have a strong relationship with tax compliance behavior.
The study contributes to the literature in several important ways. It integrates two
separate, but under-researched areas in the tax compliance field: tax compliance by firms and tax
compliance in transition countries. Theoretically, our study integrates both economic and
institutional perspectives to allow for a deeper understanding of organizational tax compliance
behavior. The economic perspective recognizes the negative impact of corruption on tax
compliance. The institutional view provides insight on how established institutional factors, such
as trust, are related to tax compliance, particularly in the presence of corruption. As social
networks frequently drive business transactions in transition economies, the differentiation
between generalized and particularized trust allows for an exploration of how established
approaches to doing business relate to tax compliance behavior.
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Empirically, the study provides much needed evidence about factors influencing
organizational tax compliance in transition economies, and contributes to the oft-neglected field
of firm tax behavior (e.g., Torgler, 2008). The results contribute to the literature by highlighting
the importance of social trust in firm-level behavior. Furthermore, the findings suggest the
difficulty of increasing organizational tax compliance in relation-based environments that rely on
close family and friends (particularized trust). Finally, in an increasingly global world,
understanding tax compliance in transition economies is also important to businesses in
developed economies. The degree of institutional distance between a host and home country
increases the difficulties of conducting business in a foreign country (Xu and Shenkar, 2002),
and understanding the differences in institutional environments is essential to effectively
working across institutional differences (Gelbuda et al. 2008).
The study proceeds as follows. The following section presents a review of the literature
and develops hypotheses investigating organizational tax compliance, corruption, and social trust
systems. The subsequent sections discuss the study’s research method and results. The final
section provides a summary and conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Tax Compliance
To date, most tax compliance studies have focused on individual behavior (Andreoni et
al. 1998). The few studies on organizational (firm) income tax evasion have typically focused on
economic influences of compliance behavior, such as the penalty structure and other means of
enforcement (e.g., Crocker and Slemod, 2005; Chen and Chu, 2005; Bayer and Cowell, 2009).
While research on tax compliance by firms has begun to develop a richer picture of the influence
of economic factors, more research is needed on the role of cultural and institutional factors.
4

Indeed, across the world, the actual rate of tax compliance by individuals and businesses alike is
vastly higher than what would be predicted under pure economic models of enforcement (e.g.,
Andreoni et al., 1998; Posner, 2000). At the individual level, social norms explain much of the
variation in cross-country tax compliance rates (Bobek et al., 2007). This suggests that broader
cultural and institutional factors may influence tax compliance at the firm level as well.
Another important and understudied area concerns tax compliance in transition
economies (Anderoni et al., 1998). Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000, p. 287) argue that tax
administration has been a significant problem in the transition from centrally-planned to a
market-based system, leading to significantly high rates of tax evasion, as “compliance rates of
50 percent or lower are not uncommon” in some nations. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab blame
the lack of attention placed on tax administration and enforcement for these rates, but also argue
that “taxpayers’ culture” plays a significant role (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000, p. 293).
More recent data also suggests that the unofficial payments to tax officials in transition countries
are a serious problem that reduces overall tax compliance rates (Joulfaian, 2009). Similarly,
Uslaner (2010) finds that tax evasion is more likely in transition countries when the perceived
quality of governmental services is low and the level of corruption is high. While Uslaner’s
(2010) analysis did not include a direct measure for “trust in the government,” he argued that
poor service quality likely translated into reduced governmental trust, which in turn reduced
incentives to comply with tax laws. Thus, cultural and institutional factors may play an
important role in tax compliance decisions. Two factors we discuss next are corruption and
social trust.
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Corruption in Transition Economies
According to the Corruption and the Private Sector report by the Transparency
International, unofficial payments received by officials in developing economies are believed to
total as much as $40 billion annually (Transparency International, 2009). The construct of
corruption is commonly defined as abuse of public power for private gain (e.g., Lapalombara,
1994; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Aguilera and Vadera, 2008). Corruption thrives in countries
where administrative apparatuses have excessive power and law enforcement lacks transparency
(Braguinsky, 1996; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). In many transition economies, corruption is
endemic (Kaufmann, 1997).
Corruption is often studied from an economic perspective. From that lens, weak
governments tend to have higher levels of corruption due to the lack of control over agencies
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Some scholars view corruption as efficiency-enhancing where it is a
needed “grease” for transactions that otherwise would be less efficient (Braguinsky, 1996; Leff,
1964). On the other hand, numerous studies have demonstrated that corruption hinders
investment and economic growth (e.g., Campos et al., 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995). High levels of corruption increase investment risk and the cost of
doing business in a country (Robertson and Watson, 2004). Empirically, studies analyzing
developing countries have found that corruption impedes economic development (Ampratwum,
2008; de la Croix and Delavallade, 2009). In a study of 54 developing countries, greater
corruption was also related to lower government efficiency (Ahmad and Brookins, 2007). The
expectation that developing countries can control corruption with increased industrialization has
been challenged due to the differences in the level of corruption among countries with the similar
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level of development (Kaufmann, 1997). These differences point to countries’ institutional
frameworks as a contributing factor to the level of corruption (Kaufmann, 1997).
Institutional theory focuses on the influence of established institutions and offers a
powerful lens for studying corruption and its impact (Li et al., 2008). According to institutional
perspective, institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience (Scott,
1987; Oliver, 1991). Money, a common language, and a unified legal system are all examples of
institutions which influence behavior routinely and almost universally by providing individuals
and organizations with scripts for actions in a given context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
According to institutional theorists, systematic practices are also institutions that create a
commonly understood social framework for behavior (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Widespread
practices become institutionalized and impose constraints on social behavior (Scott, 2001). In the
context of many transition economies, corruption is institutionalized and represents an
established institutional factor (Sajo, 2003; Teorell, 2007). Corrupt exchanges tend to be wellestablished and formalized (Jain, 2001) and thus influence the business environment.2 Corruption
and tax compliance specific to organizations are discussed next.
Corruption and Organizational Tax Compliance
In an overview of the literature investigating antecedents of organizational corruption,
Ashforth and Annand (2003) noted that engagement in corruption is mostly driven by various
environmental (e.g., strong competition, lax legal and regulatory enforcement) and
organizational factors (e.g., poor performance, structural complexity). Corruption-driven
unofficial payments can be offered proactively by the firm as a bribe or extorted by the civil

2

Institutionalization of corruption does not imply that the majority of citizens accept this behavior as ethical or
appropriate; instead, institutionalized corruption is often systematic and extensive due to power differences. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue.
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servants3 (Transparency International, 2009). Bribery is defined as “a practice of buying favors
from the bureaucrats responsible for formulating and administering the government’s economic
policies” (Leff, 1964, p. 8; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). At the organizational level, bribes are
used by firms to gain control over bureaucracy and influence decision-making (Melé, 2009;
Transparency International, 2009). Studies examining factors that contribute to bribery found
that firms were more likely to bribe if their competitors were using such practices (Li and
Ouyang, 2007; Collins et al., 2009; Venard, 2009). The level of bribery by firms in turn has vast
societal consequences, including influence on tax compliance rates (Leff, 1964).
However, extortion of unofficial payments by government officials may be a “more
serious systematic corruption problem than bribery” (Nielsen and Ballas, 2000, p. 76; Nielsen,
2003). Extortion occurs when “someone (the extortionist) demands money, or some other gift to
which he or she is not entitled, through intimidation or undue exercise of authority (Melé, 2009,
p. 141). Institutionalized extortion occurs when payments are made “in order to obtain essential
services from government where government is the key or sole provider of these services” (Sajo,
2003, p. 189). As it relates to taxation, Nielsen and Ballas (2000) describe a number of scenarios
when businesses are asked to make unofficial payments in order to continue operating, to elude
fines, and to avoid an increased tax bill. Further, extortion can be disguised as bribery when
firms have to make payments to avoid bureaucratic delays (Doh et al., 2003) or comply with
laws which were created with the purpose of creating bribery opportunities for the corrupt
officials (Neilsen, 2003). In summary, while the degree of coercion varies, unofficial payments
made for bribes and due to extortion undermine the functioning of public institutions (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003; Transparency International, 2009).

3

We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
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Two perspectives, economic and institutional, each explain why higher levels of
unofficial payments can reduce tax compliance rates. From an economic perspective, these
payments have been described as a tax on economic activity (Leff, 1964). Thus, these payments
occur in place of tax payments and divert funds from the treasury (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993;
Robertson and Watson, 2004). From an institutional perspective, when unofficial payments
become so widespread that it is an institutionalized practice, lower tax compliance rates may be
more likely. While tax compliance in transition economies has not been widely examined, two
recent studies of transition economies suggest that increased corruption-related unofficial
payments by firms to tax officials decrease the level of organizational tax compliance (Joulfaian,
2009; Uslaner, 2010). Thus, consistent with both the economic and institutional perspectives, we
expect to observe a similar relationship between extortion and/or bribery-related unofficial
payments and organizational tax compliance.
H1: Corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) is expected to have a negative impact
on organizational tax compliance in transition economies.
Social Trust and Tax Compliance
Andreoni et al. (1998) observed that social factors play an important role in tax
compliance decisions. As noted in a review of literature by Hosmer (1995), theorists from
various disciplines have recognized trust as a critically important social factor due to its
significant impact on individual behavior, relationships, and economic exchanges (e.g., Hosmer
1995; Uslaner 1999, 2002). Lewis and Weigert (1985, p. 968) defined trust as a collective
attribute that is driven by the relationships of people within a social system and is based on a
cognitive process which allows differentiating persons and institutions that are trustworthy from
the ones that are not. Zucker (1986, p. 56) noted that trust is "vital for the maintenance of
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cooperation in society and necessary as grounds for even the most routine, everyday
interactions".
Granovetter (1985) further argued that trust serves as the basis of social relationships
which drive economic behavior. Specifically relevant to this study is tax compliance behavior. A
number of prior studies have tested the link between trust and tax compliance. These studies
mainly examined the impact of trust in strangers and authorities on individual tax compliance
(e.g., Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Torgler, 2003a, 2003b; Murphy, 2004). This type of trust is
typically referred to as generalized trust. However, the impact of particularized trust (reliance on
friends and family) that is commonly associated with transition economies has not been
examined. The different types of trust and their impact on tax compliance in transition
economies are discussed next.
Generalized Trust and Tax Compliance
Generalized trust is described as a trust in strangers (Li, 2009; Dincer and Uslaner, 2010)
and reflects the “belief that others will not act contrary to our interests” (Uslaner, 1999, p. 34).
Trust among strangers not only lowers transaction costs but also leads to faster economic growth
due to increased willingness to engage in trade (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001;
Uslaner, 2002). According to Li (2009), societies with high levels of generalized trust tend to
have rules-based governance systems which are associated with fair laws, accountability, and
transparency. In such an environment, people “have confidence that others will abide by the rule
of law and cooperate in maintaining it” (Li, 2009, p. 22).
Higher levels of generalized trust in a society are associated with higher individual tax
compliance. Based on the data collected from a national survey of 299 taxpayers in the U.S.,
Scholz and Lubell (1998) showed that taxpayers’ trust in government and trust in other citizens
10

significantly influenced their levels of tax compliance. Trust in a society’s institutions also
influences tax compliance. Uslaner and Badescu (2005) argued that trust in political institutions
leads to greater compliance with the law, including paying taxes. Murphy (2004) used survey
data collected from 2,292 Australian taxpayers and found a similar relationship. Torgler (2003a,
2003b) found that trust in legal systems and public officials positively impacted individual tax
compliance and the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes in transition economies.
In summary, generalized trust has been found by previous researchers to have a positive
relationship with individual tax compliance. However, the relationship between generalized trust
and the tax compliance of organizations in transition economies has not been empirically tested.
Prior studies noted that building quality institutions that can ensure the protection of property
rights, and that the enforceability of contracts can be an important determinant for the emergence
and sustainability of generalized trust (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Raiser, 1999; Zak and
Knack, 2001). In the last two decades, transition economies have been implementing significant
reforms to ensure better functioning of legal and political institutions (Raiser, 1999). These
changes are expected to contribute to higher levels of generalized trust and a positive relationship
with tax compliance. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis that reflects the expected
relationship between generalized trust and tax compliance.
H2a: A higher degree of generalized trust is expected to be associated with higher
organizational tax compliance in transition economies.
Particularized Trust and Tax Compliance
Scholars of trust (e.g., Uslaner, 2002; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Li and Wu, 2010)
distinguish between generalized trust and particularized trust. Particularized trust is defined as
“the belief that trust can only be applied to specific individuals or individuals associated with a
certain network or group, such as family members, relatives, and friends” (Li and Wu, 2010, p.
11

135). Higher levels of particularized trust indicate greater reliance on the informal networks of
family and friends to make economic exchanges possible (Li, 2009). Such a system is described
as relation-based governance. This type of governance is characteristic of the environment
where people and firms lack faith in the legal infrastructure and strangers, but instead rely on
who they know (Li, 2009).
Countries going through the transition from a communist regime to the market economy
are affected by the conventions (e.g., norms, conventions, rules of behavior) established during
the Soviet era (Gerxhani, 2004). Under communism, individuals frequently utilized their strong
family and friendship-based connections to access goods and services (Van Ees and Bachmann,
2006, p. 14). These informal institutions continue to influence behavior and incentives in
transition (Nelson et al., 1997). For example, Russia’s blat networks that pre-date Soviet era and
relate to the use of extra-market, personal networks and contacts, in circumvention of formal
procedures, to obtain goods and services (Ledeneva 1998; Michailova and Worm, 2003).
Reportedly, blat connections in the post-Soviet era are utilized by individuals and organizations
to get better jobs, to acquire financing at privileged terms, and to obtain access to high-level
decision-makers who award business contracts and licenses (Ledeneva, 1998). While blat itself
is uniquely Russian, similar networks of family and friends exist in other transition economies
(Alon and Dwyer, 2012).
In transition economies, firms’ business transactions and tax compliance behavior are
influenced by established social conventions (Peng and Health, 1996). Countries with high levels
of particularized trust tend to have networks and groups primarily concerned with their own
interests (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, p. 45). This relation-based approach to business makes
firms more focused on personal exchanges and not broader social infrastructure (Van Ees and
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Bachmann, 2006). In such an environment, there is little faith that others will comply with laws
and pay taxes (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Thus, a higher level of particularized trust is
expected to be negatively related to tax compliance.
H2b: A higher degree of particularized trust is expected to be associated with lower
organizational tax compliance in transition economies.
Corruption and Trust: Impact on Tax Compliance
According to North (1990), in order to prevent a breakdown of economic transactions,
social norms can fill the void associated with the failure of laws and regulations. Next we
examine whether trust moderates the relationship between corruption and tax compliance. The
relationship between corruption and trust is somewhat paradoxical. While corruption is
recognized to be damaging for economic development (Ampratwum, 2008; de la Croix and
Delavallade, 2009) and government efficiency (Ahmad and Brookins, 2007), higher levels of
generalized trust moderate that relationship by allowing more firms to successfully participate in
the bidding for licenses, permits, and contracts and making the process more competitive (Li and
Wu, 2010). Unofficial payments have been found less damaging for economic development in
countries with higher levels of public trust (i.e., generalized trust) (Li, 2009). For instance, an
official accepting these payments has to evaluate whether the payee can be trusted, as unofficial
payments associated with bribery and extortion are illegal in most countries. The paying firm
also desires to avoid being caught or cheated in the transaction. Higher trust in members of
society allows both parties of a transaction to have the comfort that payment and delivery of
promised goods or services would occur 4(Li, 2009, Li and Wu, 2010). Given that prior evidence

4

It is important to note that this relationship does not apply to circumstances when corruption becomes predatory, as
“pure extortion that does not deliver value to either the briber or the society and hence, is detrimental to economic
growth” (Li and Wu, 2010, p. 136).
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suggests that the effect of corruption on economic development can vary based on the type of
trust present in a society, higher levels of generalized trust are expected to decrease the negative
impact of corruption on tax compliance.
H3a: Generalized trust moderates the relationship between corruption and tax compliance
in transition economies, such that as generalized trust increases, the negative relationship
between corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) and tax compliance weakens.
On the other hand, in an environment with high levels of particularized trust, unofficial
payments enrich corrupt officials but impoverish the state (Li and Wu, 2010). As described by Li
and Wu (2010, p. 137), particularized trust is more common in countries that have stronger social
networks among family and friends and “a low level of public trust”. A high dependence on
family and friends in doing business (particularized trust) is expected to strengthen the negative
impact of corruption on public goods in general and tax compliance in particular.
H3b: Particularized trust moderates the relationship between corruption and tax
compliance in transition economies, such that as particularized trust increases, the
negative relationship between corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) and tax
compliance is strengthened.
RESEARCH METHOD
Data
The data for this study were collected as part of the 2005 Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a project conducted by the World Bank and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The overall objective of the survey was to
obtain information on the environment for business development and private enterprise in
transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc. Earlier administrations of this survey (e.g., the
BEEPS 1999 survey) have been used in prior business ethics studies to address the antecedents
of corruption in transition economies (e.g., Venard, 2009).
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The BEEPS 2005 survey was administered in March and April 2005 by using face-toface, locally-trained interviewers. At many enterprises, the face-to-face interview was conducted
with the “person who normally represents the company for official purposes, that is who
normally deals with banks or government agencies/institutions.” The survey itself contained over
70 items focusing on the business environment of the firms, which had been refined through pilot
testing. While smaller firms typically used only one respondent in the interview, larger
institutions typically needed several respondents in order to address all of the specific topics of
the interview. Interviewees were frequently assured that their responses would be completely
anonymous and confidential.
To assure accuracy of the answers, many of the questions asked participants to assess the
actions of the “typical firm in your area of business” rather than assessing their own firm; this
indirect questioning thus made it easier for respondents to provide information (see also Venard,
2009). Interviews were also structured to elicit valid responses to sensitive questions, such as the
frequency of unofficial payments to government officials. These questions were further prefaced
with reassurances that inquires about the behavior of a “typical” firm in no way implied that the
respondent’s company approved of or condoned such behavior, were intended only to be the
respondent’s opinion in their personal capacity, and that any comments given could not be
attributed to the individual respondent or his or her company. Interview responses were audited
and clarified through call-back phone checks; a minimum of 30% of respondents received a callback check (100% in Russia and the Asian Republics).
The BEEPS 2005 survey was designed to be representative of the population of each
country in terms of ownership, size, geographic location, and industry sub-sector. The survey
was administered to 9,655 enterprises in 27 transition countries. For the purposes of this study,
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responses from enterprises in five countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Yugoslavia, with an aggregate of 2,028 responses) were eliminated because these countries
were not included in the World Values Survey, which contained the data for one of the variables
(described in a subsequent sub-section). Other enterprises were eliminated if they failed to
respond to one of the measures used in the study (2,483 responses). The final data set for the
study included the responses from 5,144 enterprises representing 22 transition countries.
Table 1 contains information regarding the number of responses from each of the 22
countries included in the sample. Table 1 also includes information about the average reported
rates of tax compliance from each of these countries, including the average sales, workforce, and
wage bill reported for tax purposes, and a summed total of these tax compliance measures (tax
compliance scale). Overall, the average compliance rate reported was between 85.6-88.9% for
these three measures. Russia (tax compliance scale of 284, or an average of 94.7%) and Poland
(tax compliance scale of 283, or an average of 94.3%) had the highest levels of average tax
compliance, while Bosnia/Herzegovina (tax compliance scale of 208, or an average of 69.3%)
and Azerbaijan (tax compliance scale of 221, or an average of 73.7%) had the lowest average
levels.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Model
We employ the following model in examining the effect of corruption and trust on tax
compliance:
TAXCOMPLY = a + bX + dC + e

(1)

where TAXCOMPLY is a measure of tax compliance by firms in transition economies; X is a set
of test variables pertaining to corrutption and trust; C is a set of control variables representing
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other factors that could be related to tax compliance in transition economies; and e represents the
traditional error term. We describe each of the variables and their measures in the subsequent
sub-section.
The data used to predict the influence of corruption and trust on tax compliance in
transition economies originates from both firm-level and country-level (i.e., generalized trust)
responses. This use of multi-level data signifies that ordinary-least squares regression is not an
appropriate modeling technique because different types of error variation are present. Thus, a
multi-level, mixed-effects, restricted maximum likelihood (REML) regression is used for
estimating the model.5 We treat “country” as a random effect to control for the potential
differences at the country-level of analysis.
Measures
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the study is the level of tax compliance, or TAXCOMPLY. This
variable is measured as the summed response to three questions in the BEEPS study: (1)
“Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations,
what percentage of annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business
reports for tax purposes?”, (2) “Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully
complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total workforce would you estimate the
typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes?”, and (3) “Recognizing the
difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with labor regulation, what percentage of the
actual wage bill would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax
purposes?” Respondents answered each question indicating a percentage. Factor analysis of the

5

Unlike maximum likelihood estimators, REML takes the number of parameters into account. Since the number of
countries in the analysis (22) is fairly low, we use REML regression.

17

three questions indicated that the constructs all loaded on to one factor, indicating unidimensionality; furthermore, the Cronbach’s alpha of the three items (0.891) indicated sufficient
reliability. Thus, the three measures are summed to form an overall “tax compliance scale”
measure for our primary analysis. In supplemental analyses, we conduct separate analyses for the
three types of tax compliance decisions to further investigate the influence of our hypothesized
variables on these different types of tax compliance.
Independent Variables
The 2005 BEEPS survey contains multiple questions that measure the extent to which
firms made “unofficial” payments and gifts during the year (Venard, 2009). Specifically,
respondents answered the question, “Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like
yours would make in a given year, could you please tell me how often they make
payments/gifts?” for a variety of purposes. Due to our study’s focus on tax compliance, our
measure of CORRUPTION reflects unofficial payments that would be made in “dealing with
taxes and tax collection.” This question was answered on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging
from never (“1”) to always (“6”). While this measure does not distinguish between payments
given as bribes to control and influence decision making or due to extortion by government
officials, both types of unofficial payments are forms of corruption that undermine the
functioning of public institutions.
The measure for generalized trust, or trust in strangers, was not captured in the BEEPS
survey. Instead, a country-level measure from the World Values Survey was utilized. The World
Values Survey contains data from thousands of randomly selected individuals in 57 societies on
a range of attitudes and values (La Porta et al. 1997). This study’s analysis uses the 2005 version
of the questionnaire. One of the questions was: "Generally speaking, would you say that most
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people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Following Knack
and Keefer (1996) and La Porta et al. (1997), the proportion of individuals answering “most
people can be trusted” (as opposed to whether people “need to be very careful”) is our measure
of generalized trust, or GEN-TRUST. According to Knack and Keefer (1996, p. 1256), while the
term ‘people’ in the question is fairly ambiguous, it is “general enough that responses should not
merely reflect expectations about the behavior of friends and family.” This measure is also
consistent with other conceptualizations of generalized trust as the extent to which people
“believe that most people share common values and are willing to trust strangers who may
outwardly seem quite different from themselves” (Uslander and Conley, 2003, p. 335). Thus,
higher degrees of generalized trust are associated with higher levels of trust in the broader
community and willingness “to trust strangers who may outwardly seem quite different from
themselves” (Uslander and Conley, 2003, p. 335).
The measure of particularized trust, or the degree of reliance on family or friends,
originates from the BEEPS survey. According to Li (2009), particularized trust manifests itself
through trust in a relationship and is apparent in trusting family members and friends to
safeguard and conduct business. Thus, our measure of particularized trust is the response to the
question, “How important are [family and friends] as potential sources of information about new
customers for your firm?” Responses for the variable PART-TRUST ranged on a 1-5 Likert-type
scale, with 1 = “slightly important” and 5 = “extremely important.” This measure is consistent
with the Uslaner and Conley’s (2003, p. 335) conceptualization of particularized trust as the
degree to which people “do have faith in other people but only in other people from their own
group” and who base their relationships on “family, close friends, and member of their own
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groups,” with the measure capturing the degree to which respondents rely on friends and family
members.
Control Variables
We include additional variables from the BEEPS survey that have been shown in prior
research to influence tax compliance. Uslaner (2010) identifies the quality of governmental
services as an important influence on tax compliance. Following Uslaner (2010), the proxy for
the quality of infrastructure services is the number of days of power outages or disruptions in the
past 12 months, or SERVICE.6 We also follow Uslaner (2010) and include a control for the
fairness of the legal system, LEGAL. While Uslaner (2010) used a one-item measure for this
measure, we develop a multi-item scale that measures whether the court system is perceived as
fair and impartial, honest, quick, affordable, and able to enforce its decisions. Each of these five
measures is measured on a 6-point Likert-type scale; factor analysis identifies one dimension,
and the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.849.
Another important control used by Uslaner (2010) is the size of the firm, as larger firms
tend to have higher levels of tax compliance. Our measure of size, SIZE, originates from the
BEEPS survey and is divided into three categories: small firms (less than 50 full-time
employees), medium-size firms (more than 50 but less than 250 full-time employees) and largesize firms (more than 250 but less than 10,000 full-time employees)7. Again following Uslaner
(2010), we also consider the ownership structure of the firm, and include a control for the
percentage of ownership by private, domestic individuals or organizations, OWNER.
Finally, we include two additional variables to control for their potential influence on tax
compliance. First, given that the tax management behavior of firms may be influenced by
6

We considered a multi-item measure that contains other measures of the infrastructure services, but as the measure
does not demonstrate sufficient reliability, we follow Uslaner (2010) and use the one-item measure.
7
The BEEPS Questionnaire did not include firms with more than 10,000 full-time employees.
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corporate governance attributes (e.g., Minnick and Noga, 2010), we include a measure for
whether the firms’ financial statements are checked or certified by an external auditor, AUDIT.
Second, we also control for the effectiveness of unofficial payments or “private gifts.” Uslaner
(2010) demonstrated that the degree of influence the firm had on the government negatively
affected the level of tax compliance; thus, we include EFFECT, a five-point Likert-type scale
assessing the perceived effectiveness of the firm’s unofficial payments to affect the votes of
legislators.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the study’s
analysis, including the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. Examination of
summary information indicates that generalized trust is fairly low in transition economies (with
only 23.3% perceiving that “most people” could be trusted); particularized trust is also fairly low
(mean of 2.55 on a 5-point Likert-type scale assessing reliance on family and friends). Frequency
of corruption as it relates to unofficial payments for tax purposes averaged at 1.95, based on a 6point scale.
Table 2, Panel B presents information about the average level of the study’s independent
variables by country: the tax-related corruption scale, generalized trust, and particularized trust.
Azerbaijan (3.01), the Slovak Republic (2.82), and Ukraine (2.82) had the highest average
frequency of unofficial payments for tax purposes, whereas Croatia (1.26) had the lowest
average levels. Ukraine (generalized trust of 0.3029) and Hungary (generalized trust of 0.3018)
demonstrated the highest average levels of trust in strangers while FYR Macedonia had the
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lowest average levels (generalized trust of 0.1111). Finally, trust in family and friends is highest
in Latvia (particularized trust of 3.29) and lowest in Poland (particularized trust of 2.08).
[Insert Table 2 here]
Correlation Analysis
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix with all of the study’s variables. As shown in Table
3, the highest correlation between any of the test variables and control variables is between
CORRUPTION and EFFECT (correlation coefficient of 0.293); not surprisingly, higher levels of
unofficial payments for tax purposes are associated with greater perceived effectiveness of the
payments. The largest correlation in the matrix among any of the control variables is between
SIZE and OWNER (correlation coefficient of -0.365), indicating that smaller firms tended to have
higher levels of private domestic ownership. Overall, none of the correlations between any of the
model variables indicate the potential presence of multicollinearity.
The correlations show that CORRUPTION is positively associated with PART-TRUST,
SERVICE, and OWNER; the variable is negatively associated with LEGAL. Thus, firms with
higher frequency of unofficial payments have higher levels of particularized trust (reliance on
family and friends), suffer more power outages, have a higher level of private domestic
ownership, and perceive the legal system as less fair. These factors indicate that tax-related
unofficial payments are more common among firms with greater dependence on close friends
and family members.
The dependent variable TAXCOMPLY is negatively associated with CORRUPTION and
PART-TRUST, but is positively associated with GEN-TRUST. Tax compliance is therefore lower
among firms with a higher frequency of tax-related unofficial payments and those that rely on
family and friends, but is higher when trust in strangers is higher.
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[Insert Table 3 here]
Mixed Effect Regression Results
To investigate the role of tax-related unofficial payments and social trust on tax
compliance in transition economies, two models are estimated. The first model (Model 1) is
estimated by regressing firm tax compliance directly on CORRUPTION, GEN-TRUST, PARTTRUST, and the set of control variables (i.e., only main effects and the control variables are
estimated). The second model (Model 2) is estimated by adding the interaction terms between
CORRUPTION and GEN-TRUST, and between CORRUPTION and PART-TRUST.8 Table 4
reports the regression results for both models, including the parameter estimates and standard
errors for each independent variable. All reported p-values are two-tailed, with the exception of
directional hypothesized variables, which are one-tailed. Both models include random effects for
the country grouping, and both models are statistically significant (both p < .0001).
[Insert Table 4 here]
Hypothesis 1 anticipated that corruption would be negatively related to organizational tax
compliance in transition economies. As shown in Table 4, the coefficient for CORRUPTION is
significant and negative in both model specifications (both p < .01). Thus, consistent with prior
research (e.g., Joulfaian, 2009; Uslaner, 2010), Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicted a complex relationship with the role of social trust on firm tax
compliance. Specifically, Hypothesis 2a predicted that higher levels of generalized trust would
be associated with higher levels of tax compliance, whereas Hypothesis 2b predicted that higher
levels of particularized trust would be associated with lower degrees of tax compliance (Li,
2009). The coefficient on GEN-TRUST is positive and statistically significant at p < .05 in the

8

Interaction terms were not mean-centered, since research suggests that mean-centering of variables does not reduce
multicollinearity (Echambadi and Hess, 2007).
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first model specification (without the interaction term), showing that higher levels of generalized
trust are associated with higher tax compliance levels. However, the coefficient is no longer
statistically significant when the interaction terms between the trust variables and corruption are
added in the second (full) model. Hypothesis 2a is therefore not supported in the full model. The
coefficient on PART-TRUST is negative and is statistically significant (p < .01) across both
model specifications. Firms with a higher reliance on friends and family members (particularized
trust) have a lower level of tax compliance, in line with the prediction of Li (2009) that rules of
law are weaker in relation-based governance systems. Thus, Hypothesis 2b is supported.
Next we investigated an interaction effect between the corruption and social trust.
Hypothesis 3a examined whether generalized trust would moderate the relationship between
corruption and tax compliance, whereas Hypothesis 3b examined whether particularized trust
moderates that relationship. Inspection of Model 2 in Table 4 shows that there is a statistically
significant positive interaction between corruption and generalized trust (p <.01); however, the
interaction between corruption and particularized trust fails to reach statistical significance.
Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported (the interaction between corruption and generalized trust),
whereas Hypothesis 3b is not supported (the interaction between corruption and particularized
trust).
To further explore the implication of the positive coefficients on the interaction term
between generalized trust and corruption in Table 4, we dichomized both variables at the scale
median and graphed the interaction; see Figure 1. Figure 1 demonstrates that when corruption
levels are low, then differences in generalized trust are not related to tax compliance levels –
indeed, tax compliance levels are nearly identical in conditions of both high and low generalized
trust. However, when corruption levels are high, then tax compliance is higher with higher levels
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of generalized trust and is lower with lower levels of generalized trust. This interaction effect
explains why a main effect for generalized trust on tax compliance was not found in the full
model (Hypothesis 2a), and that the negative relationship between corruption and tax compliance
is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust, therefore supporting Hypothesis 3a. Thus, it
appears that whereas particularized trust is directly related to tax compliance (higher levels of
particularized trust are associated with lower levels of tax compliance), generalized trust has an
indirect relationship (generalized trust is not related to tax compliance when corruption levels are
low, but higher generalized trust is linked to higher levels of tax compliance when corruption
rates are high).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Several of the model control variables had a statistically significant relationship with tax
compliance; see Table 4. The coefficients on LEGAL and SIZE are both positive and statistically
significant (both p < .01 across both model specifications). Thus, larger firms are more likely to
comply with tax laws, as are firms that perceive the legal system as fairer (Uslaner, 2010). The
coefficient on OWNER is negative and statistically significant (p < .01 in both model
specifications), indicating that firms with a higher percentage of private, domestic ownership
have lower levels of tax compliance. The coefficient on EFFECT is also negative and
statistically significant (p < .01) in both model specifications, showing that firms whose
unofficial payments were more effective had lower levels of tax compliance. However, the
coefficients on SERVICE and AUDIT were not statistically significant in either specification,
demonstrating that the quality of the service infrastructure and the presence of an external audit
were not related to the levels of tax compliance.
Supplemental Analyses
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Our primary analysis investigated the effects of bribery and trust on a measure of overall
tax compliance. However, our measure of TAXCOMPLY was an aggregate of three different
measures of tax compliance behavior: reported sales, workforce, and wages. Supplemental
analyses conducts separate regressions on these three types of tax compliance to determine if any
of the hypothesized variables or other factors have differential influences.
Table 5 presents separate regressions for each of the three separate tax compliance
measures. Each of the findings for the primary analysis (with the overall tax compliance
measure) continues to be statistically significant in these supplemental analyses. Specifically,
corruption and particularized trust are associated with lower tax compliance levels, while the
interaction between corruption and generalized trust continues. The only exception is that
generalized trust has a positive, statistically significant relationship (p < .10) with tax compliance
for the percentage of annual sales reported; thus, Hypothesis 2a appears to be supported for sales
reporting behavior (but not for overall tax compliance). Overall, the study’s findings appear to be
robust across different measures of tax compliance behavior.9
[Insert Table 5 here]

9

Several sensitivity tests further assessed the robustness of the study’s findings. First, it is possible that a reduction
in the level of tax compliance could cause more corruption activities, such that the study’s model could suffer from
reverse causality (endogeneity). We conduct a Hausman test to test for the possibility of endogeneity between
corruption and tax compliance. The Hausman test does not demonstrate that endogeneity is present in the study’s
model, indicating that the causal inference presented in the model between corruption (as an independent variable)
and tax compliance (as a dependent variable) is reasonable. Second, our study’s dependent variables are implicitly
treated as continuous variables in the regression models; we conduct a sensitivity test to determine if this assumption
biases the results. As an alternative analysis, we use a Tobit model to account for the fact that some possible models
are censored (e.g., those below 0 or above 300 with the aggregated dependent variable measure or above 100 with
the separate tax compliance measures). Results are virtually identical; thus, the presented mixed-effect regression
models do not appear to be biased. Third, additional analyses considered the effect of gross domestic product (GDP)
or gross national income (GNI) on tax compliance; results are unchanged, and neither variable approaches statistical
significance.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study examined the association between institutional factors and tax compliance in
transition economies. Specifically, the study is the first to examine the impact of social trust on
this behavior, and to distinguish between generalized trust (trust in strangers) and particularized
trust (trust in family and friends) (Li, 2009). Based on a sample of executives from over 5,000
firms in transition economies of the Soviet Bloc, the results confirm that tax compliance is lower
among firms with higher levels of tax-related unofficial payments and higher levels of
particularized trust. Interestingly, we also find that the negative relationship between corruption
and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust. Thus, results suggest
that dependence on family and friends is directly associated with significantly lower tax
compliance. Conversely, trust in strangers (i.e., society at large) does not generally appear to be
directly associated with firm tax compliance behavior, but has a significant indirect relationship
through weakening the detrimental effects of corruption. These findings are robust for separate
measures of tax compliance behavior: the total annual sales, workforce, and wages reported.
The results of this study should also be interpreted in light of its limitations. First, the
dataset is based on self-reported measures, which have been questioned by some researchers due
to potential response and common method biases (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002;
Podsakoff et al., 2003). Data from survey respondents also might be more valid in environments
where there is high generalized trust among strangers, as such individuals from such cultures
could be more likely to disclose sensitive information to an unknown interviewer. On the other
hand, individuals in environments with a low degree of generalized trust may be less likely to
disclose sensitive information to survey interviewers. Thus, the results should be interpreted with
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this caveat. However, the use of the survey methodology is considered valuable for measuring
perceptions and outcome variables in changing conditions (Griffin, 1991; Spector, 1994).
Second, the dataset resulted from in-person interviews with firm executives; smaller
firms were typically represented by only one executive. While using data from only one
respondent per firm could result in a biased impression of the firm, the use of such a technique is
similar to other international corruption research (e.g., Venard, 2009). Third, while the model
included an array of control variables that have been shown in past research as related to firm tax
compliance of transition economies (e.g., the legal environment, service infrastructure, firm size,
etc.), other control variables might also be related to tax compliance and could potentially alter
the association between corruption and trust. However, we followed prior research in including
the control variables that have shown to be influential in prior tax compliance studies on
transition economies (e.g., Uslaner, 2010). Fourth, in this study we focused on the tax-related
unofficial payments made by the firms, but could not differentiate whether these were given as
bribes to gain control and influence decision making or extorted by the government officials.
Both undermine the functioning of public institutions, however, and are both forms of
corruption. Finally, most of the variables in the study were at the firm level, but the measure for
generalized trust originated at the country level. This concern is assuaged by the fact that our
model used a mixed-effects regression analysis that controlled for group (country) random
effects. Future extensions could address these limitations.
The results of this study have important implications for the literature on international tax
compliance. Understanding the antecedents of compliance in transition economies is particularly
important due to the low compliance levels in these countries (Andreoni et al. 1998). This study
answers the call of Andreoni et al. (1998) to investigate the relationship of cultural factors and
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tax compliance, focusing on social trust. The study also contributes to the neglected field of
study of corporate tax compliance (Torgler, 2008; Bayer and Cowell, 2009), showing that
institutional factors such as corruption and trust are particularly important in explaining
organizational behavior. The study also establishes the difficulty in increasing organizational tax
compliance in relation-based environments that rely on close friends and family, suggesting that
increasing generalized trust is important for improving tax compliance in transition economies.
The different effects of generalized and particularized trust also imply that future researchers
should be careful in distinguishing between these types of trust (Li, 2009). Finally, understanding
the differences in institutional environments is essential to effectively working across
institutional differences (Gelbuda et al. 2008), and the results of this study are useful in
explaining the different vantage points of developed and developing nations.
Future researchers can build off this study and further investigate some of the significant
findings. For example, the study showed that the effectiveness of unofficial payments is related
to the level of firm tax compliance, as tax compliance was lower for firms who perceived their
payments as more effective in affecting the votes of elected officials. Future research could
examine other factors associated with this relationship. Differentiating between unofficial
payments associated with bribes as compared to the extorted payments would shed light on
whether different types of corruption have a unique impact on tax compliance. Similarly, the
importance of generalized and particularized trust could be examined in non-transition
economies. Furthermore, researchers could examine the effectiveness of potential preventive or
educational measures being considered to address problems with tax compliance and corruption
in transition economies. Another useful avenue would be the comparison of tax compliance in
transition economies with developed countries to determine if similar relationships are present.
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In all, this study demonstrates that decreasing tax-related corruption, increasing trust in strangers,
and, interestingly, decreasing reliance on family and friends are all ways to increase tax
compliance of firms in transition economies. Future research can build upon this work.
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Table 1
Description of the Sample
Country

Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia/
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Estonia
FYR
Macedonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kyrgyz
Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Serbia
Slovak
Republic
Ukraine
Average by
Country

Number of
Respondents
in Final
Sample
144
171
152
186
74

Tax Compliance
Scale: Mean
(S.D.)

Average Sales
Reported for
Tax Purposes

228 (80)
254 (66)
221 (61)
272 (44)
208 (63)

134
191
902

76.3%
86.6%
74.9%
92.3%
66.8%

Average
Workforce
Reported for
Tax Purposes
77.7%
84.5%
72.8%
91.9%
72.1%

Average Wage
Bill Reported
for Tax
Purposes
74.2%
83.6%
72.9%
68.6%
68.6%

266 (61)
276 (37)
267 (46)

88.7%
92.5%
89.8%

89.7%
92.0%
89.5%

87.3%
91.5%
87.3%

392
360

266 (57)
268 (45)

89.3%
88.3%

90.6%
91.2%

85.5%
87.7%

295
93
231

264 (54)
283 (40)
269 (49)

86.9%
94.7%
87.1%

88.6%
93.8%
94.1%

88.3%
94.5%
87.4%

218
124
112
95
91
297
382
309

268 (49)
276 (41)
272 (48)
276 (45)
265 (59)
284 (31)
280 (41)
255 (61)

87.9%
93.5%
89.9%
95.5%
89.1%
94.9%
92.5%
85.8%

91.0%
94.0%
93.2%
90.8%
89.4%
95.1%
95.1%
85.2%

89.4%
88.6%
88.6%
89.4%
86.3%
94.4%
92.7%
83.7%

191
22 countries

277 (43)
254

91.0%
87.9%

94.3%
88.9%

92.3%
85.6%

Note: “Tax Compliance Scale” is measured as the sum of the average sales reported for tax purposes, the average
workforce reported for tax purposes, and the average wage bill reported for tax purposes.
All data is taken from the 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2005 BEEPS).
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Table 2, Panel A
Overall Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

TAXCOMPLY
CORRUPTION
GEN-TRUST
PART-TRUST
SERVICE
LEGAL
SIZE
OWNER
AUDIT
EFFECT

265.891
1.952
0.233
2.549
10.963
13.952
1.389
81.983
0.460
0.369

Standard
Deviation
52.284
1.327
0.054
1.368
45.696
5.579
0.655
36.459
0.498
0.797

Minimum

Maximum

40
1
.111
1
0
1
1
0
0
0

300
6
.303
5
365
30
3
100
1
4

Variable Definitions:
TAXCOMPLY is the sum of responses to three questions (each up to 100) measuring tax compliance; higher
numbers indicate greater compliance.
CORRUPTION assesses unofficial gifts or payments to deal with taxes and tax collection (on a 6-point Likert-type
scale); higher numbers indicate greater levels of corruption.
GEN-TRUST is a country-level of the percentage of people who believe that most people can be trusted; higher
proportions indicate greater generalized trust and trust in strangers.
PART-TRUST is a 5-point Likert-type scale assessing the degree of reliance on family and friends in business;
higher levels indicate greater reliance on family and friends.
SERVICE is the number of days of power outages or disruptions in the past 12 months.
LEGAL is the sum of five statements (each on a 6-point Likert-type scale) assessing the perceived fairness of the
legal system, with higher values indicating higher perceived fairness of the legal system.
SIZE assesses whether the firms are small (coded as 1, with less than 50 employees), medium sized (coded as 2, with
50-249 employees), or large (250-9,999 employees).
OWNER is the percentage of ownership by private, domestic individuals or organizations.
AUDIT is a measure of corporate governance, taking a value of “1” if the firms’ financial statements have been
certified by an external auditor and “0” if they have not.
EFFECT is a five-point Likert-type scale assessing the perceived effectiveness of the firm’s unofficial payments to
affect the votes of legislators; higher values indicated greater perceived effectiveness.
Descriptive statistics are based on 5,144 observations.
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Table 2, Panel B
Descriptive Statistics by Country of Independent Variables
Country

Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia/
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
FYR
Macedonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kyrgyz
Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Serbia
Slovak
Republic
Ukraine
Average by
Country

Average Level of taxrelated
CORRUPTION
1.79
2.18
3.01
1.38
2.51

Average Level of
GEN-TRUST

Average Level of
PART-TRUST

0.2565
0.2468
0.2053
0.2454
0.2193

3.06
2.95
3.12
2.20
2.62

2.37
1.26
1.55

0.2530
0.2509
0.2930

3.14
2.27
2.52

2.02
1.51

0.2152
0.1111

2.29
2.29

1.76
1.62
1.78

0.1847
0.3018
0.1667

2.62
2.32
2.45

1.90
1.46
1.55
1.25
1.51
2.73
2.24
2.82

0.2474
0.2192
0.1823
0.2331
0.1964
0.2918
0.2580
0.1683

3.29
2.23
2.21
2.08
2.73
2.95
2.41
2.49

2.82
1.95

0.3029
0.230

2.26
2.57
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
Variable
TAXCOMPLY
CORRUP
TION
GEN-TRUST
PART-TRUST
SERVICE
LEGAL
SIZE
OWNER
AUDIT
EFFECT

TAXCOM
PLY
1.0
-.236***

CORRUP
TION

.081***
-.116***
-.120***
.104***
.129***
-.125***
.028**
-.178***

.025
.112***
.154***
-.053***
-.047***
.058***
.037**
.293***

GENTRUST

PARTTRUST

1.0
.045***
-.056***
-.005
-.004
.046***
-.196***
.059***

1.0
.056***
-.028**
-.226***
.213***
-.170***
.108***

SERVICE

LEGAL

SIZE

OWNER

AUDIT

EFFECT

1.0
-.017
-.030**
.034**
.089***
.079***

1.0
.126***
-.077***
.104***
-.058***

1.0
-.365***
.320***
.006

1.0
-.212***
.024

1.0
-.019

1.0

1.0

*, p < .10; **, p < .05; ***, p < .01 (all presented p-values are two-tailed)
See Table 2 for variable definitions.
Correlation matrix is based on 5,144 observations.
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Table 4
Mixed Effect Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Tax Compliance

Variable
Test Variables
CORRUPTION (H1)
GEN-TRUST (H2a)
PART-TRUST (H2b)
GEN-TRUST x CORRUPTION (H3a)
PART-TRUST x CORRUPTION (H3b)

Model 1 (Main
Effects)
Parameter
Estimates

Model 2 (with
Interaction Effects)
Parameter Estimates

-8.182 (0.62)***
126.259 (72.99)**
-1.582 (0.57)***

-16.437 (2.84)***
60.182 (74.05)
-1.877 (0.98)**
34.138 (11.29)***
0.126 (0.42)

Control Variables
SERVICE
LEGAL
SIZE
OWNER
AUDIT
EFFECT
Constant

-0.020 (0.02)
0.562 (0.13)***
5.280 (1.25)***
-0.111 (0.02)***
-0.511 (1.65)
-5.929 (0.98)***
251.798 (17.59)***

-0.019 (0.02)
0.578 (0.13)***
5.326 (1.25)***
-0.112 (0.02)***
-0.404 (1.65)
-6.266 (0.99)***
267.542 (17.88)***

Model
Country (Group) Random Effects
Wald χ2
Prob. > χ2

Included
447.28
< .0001

Included
457.96
<.0001

Note: Values in parentheses denote the standard errors of the estimates; mixed-effect regression
results use restricted maximum likelihood (REML). The mixed-effect regression model is based
on 5,144 observations.
*p < .10; ** p< .05; *** p<.01 (directional hypothesized variables are one-tailed p-values;
remaining variables are two-tailed p-values)
See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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Table 5
Supplemental Analyses

Variable
Test Variables
CORRUPTION (H1)
GEN-TRUST (H2a)
PART-TRUST (H2b)
GEN-TRUST x CORRUPTION
(H3a)
PART-TRUST x CORRUPTION
(H3b)

Tax Compliance:
Sales
Parameter Estimates

Tax Compliance:
Workforce
Parameter Estimates

Tax Compliance:
Wages
Parameter Estimates

-3.765 (1.05)***
36.744 (26.03)*
-0.867 (0.36)***
5.520 (4.18)*

-5.254 (1.02)***
8.411 (25.44)
-0.446 (0.35)*
12.02 (4.03)***

-7.512 (1.11)***
13.984 (25.02)
-0.576 (0.38)*
16.979 (4.42)***

0.074 (0.15)

-0.026 (0.15)

0.082 (0.16)

Control Variables
SERVICE
LEGAL
SIZE
OWNER
AUDIT
EFFECT
Constant

-0.05 (0.01)
0.207 (0.05)***
1.382 (0.46)***
-0.036 (0.01)***
-0.363 (0.61)
-1.765 (0.37)***
85.666 (6.30)***

-0.009 (0.01)
0.172 (0.05)***
1.614 (0.45)***
-0.034 (0.01)***
-0.151 (0.59)
-2.22 (0.35)***
92.59 (6.15)***

-0.006 (0.01)
0.199 (0.05)***
2.332 (0.49)***
-0.042 (0.02)***
0.136 (0.65)
-2.311 (0.39)***
89.579 (6.099)***

Model
Country (Group) Random Effects
Wald χ2
Prob. > χ2

Included
299.97
< .0001

Included
357.53
<.0001

Included
456.92
<.0001

*p < .10; ** p< .05; ***p< .01 (directional hypothesized variables are one-tailed p-values; remaining variables are two-tailed p-values)
See Table 2 for variable definitions and Table 4 for model specifications.
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Figure 1: Interaction of Corruption and Generalized Trust
(for Overall Tax Compliance)
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